Anti-Corruption Efforts in Iraq:
 Strategies That Can Make a Difference

By Brian C. Murphy

[Brian C. Murphy recently served as Program Manager of the Anti-Corruption Coordination Office with the U.S. Embassy in Iraq.  He has worked in support of the rule of law in some dozen countries an has long been an active member of the Federal Bar Association.  The views expressed here are his and not necessarily those of the U.S. Government.  He gratefully acknowledges the close review and insightful comments of Dr. Danny Athanasaw, Mr. Daniel Miller, Mr. David C. Murphy, and Mr. Gerald W. Murphy.]

The Problem of Corruption in Iraq

 Corruption in Iraq has been a pervasive and continuing problem that frustrates and adversely affects both the average person living in Iraq and the international donors who are working to provide basic services, as well as putative investors who have little confidence in the organs of government in Iraq.   Transparency International has consistently ranked Iraq as second or third from the bottom in its world-wide rankings [Corruption Index].  Some would say that corruption is a "way of life" in Iraq, with many governmental institutions and processes suffused with corrupt practices

Much has been done by the international donor community to stem public corruption, with some of these efforts matched by the Government of Iraq.  Increasingly, the importance of fighting corruption is emerging as an important policy objective of  the Government of Iraq

Anti-Corruption Efforts of the Government of Iraq:  The Offices of Inspectors General, the Board of Supreme Audit and the Commission of Integrity

The Inspectors General

Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA] Order No.57, signed by CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer III  on February 10, 2004, established within each Iraqi ministry an Office of Inspector General . . . headed by an Inspector General" [IG].  The IGs were initially appointed to serve a 5-year term, which could be renewed for an additional 5-year period.  Upon the June 2004 restoration of sovereignty to Iraq [and dissolution of the CPA.], the power to appoint IGs shifted to the Prime Minister’s Office.  Under CPA Order No. 57, IGs report directly to the relevant minister and may be removed only for cause.  CPA Order No. 57 remains in effect today, although an Iraqi-drafted proposed replacement law is currently working its way through the national legislature.

The duties of Iraqi IGs are strikingly similar to those of their U.S. counterparts.  These include, but are not limited to, auditing a ministry’s records and activities; conducting administrative investigations; receiving and assessing allegations concerning waste, fraud and abuse that affect the ministry’s interests; recommending corrective actions to the minister; and cooperating with investigative agencies and the judiciary in matters warrenting their attention.

To accomplish these broad objectives, the IGs are to be accorded full and unrestricted access to all [ministerial] offices.  Further, CPA Order 57 provides IGs with the power to subpoena witnesses and documents. Ultimately, the IGs are supposed to report their findings to their respective minister and issue an annual report to the Iraqi public.

The Commission of Integrity

The Commission on Public Integrity [CPI] was established by Order No, 55 of the Coalition Provisional Authority on January 28, 2004, and it was succeeded by the Commission of Integrity [CoI], which now functions actively.

The CPA envisioned Iraq’s IGs as one leg of that newly liberated country’s three main anticorruption institutions.  The other two are the Commission of Integrity [CoI], which has law enforcement capacity, and the Board of Supreme Audit, which is roughly analogous to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Importantly, BSA and CoI are independent commissions under the Iraqi Constitution; the IGs are not.  This confers on BSA and CoI an additional layer of legal authority that the IGs do not possess.

CPA Order No, 55 established CoI as Iraq’s lead anti-corruption agency.  CoI possesses the statutory authority to investigate allegations of public corruption, from whatever source, and to forward those cases which merit judicial action to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.  Additionally, CoI is charged with educating the Iraqi populace about the dangers of corruption and drafting and administering financial disclosure regulations for all Government of Iraq employees.

The Board of Supreme Audit

CPA Order No. 77 outlines BSA’s duties as Iraq’s primary audit institution.  The Board of Supreme Audit [BSA] conducts regular financial audits of the Iraqi  ministries and reports its findings to CoI and to the relevant IG. Unlike CoI and the IGs, however, BSA was not established by the Coalition Provisional Authority.  Instead, it was set up during the British occupation of Iraq in the 1920s.  BSA’s longevity sets it apart from its sister anti-corruption institutions and induces it to guard jealously what it perceives as its prerogatives.

The Work of the Anti-Corruption Agencies in Practice

In this tripartite system, personnel from the ministerial offices of Inspectors General are the only ones who have regular, daily involvement with the ministries.  They are often the first to uncover potential abuses or crimes. Thus, when an IG determines that a matter may involve corruption, fraud, embezzlement, or outright theft on the part of a ministerial employee, Order No. 57 requires the IG to refer this information to CoI, along with whatever evidence the IG has gathered to date.  CoI then conducts further inquiries and determines whether the case should be forwarded to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq for adjudication.  In practice, there are many problems with the flow of information among the anti-corruption institutions.  There is no established evidentiary threshold that triggers a case referral from an IG to CoI . This has created substantial confusion.  On occasion, CoI has seemed to believe that certain IGs are being uncooperative, because they have forwarded little or no case data to CoI, while the IGs have often seemed unsure how much evidence they needed to gather before sending a case file to CoI.  Furthermore, CoI does not have the investigatory capacity to deploy its agents to the ministries to gather evidence and take testimony.  CoI usually just receives a file from an IG and then sends back a written list of questions to the IG.

. This exchange of paper can take years. The Inspectors General often resent being asked to do what they perceive as CoI's bidding.  Institutional distrust also often limits cooperation. In the post-Saddam era, acute political rivalries have seriously hampered the relationship between some IGs and CoI’s Commissioner.  BSA has been somewhat reluctant to participate in the U.S.-designed anti-corruption structure. BSA is often reluctant to provide its audit findings to the other two anticorruption agencies.  No formal information-sharing process exists and data requests are usually handled in person and at the highest levels.

Efforts of the International Donor Community to Reduce Corruption in Iraq

Anti-Corruption efforts in Iraq have received strong support from the U.S. Government through the U.S. Embassy and the US Agency for International Development [ through its TATWEER Program] and other organizations within the international donor community, including the Department of International Development [DFID] of the United Kingdom, as well as from the European Union.  The United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], along with non-governmental organizations, such as the Iraq Foundation[IF] and the International Republican Institute for International Affairs [IRI], are also playing significant roles in supporting indigenous Iraqi ant-corruption efforts, through vigorous country-wide training efforts.  For example, IRI has conducted numerous training workshops on the importance of establishing provincial gazettes for the promulgation of laws, regulations and official policies [similar to the role played by the Federal Register in the U.S.A.].  IF and UNDP have conducted many training and education sessions, countywide, focusing on the need to implement the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the National Anti-Corruption Strategy for Iraq.  These efforts have reached large audiences, with seemingly favorable effect.

Efficacy of Anti-Corruption Efforts in IRAQ

The effectiveness of Anti-corruption efforts in Iraq has been questionable.   For corruption to be curbed—or substantially reduced--in Iraq, the commitment of the Government and the people of Iraq is essential.  But, that support is  questionable.  This has been noticeably evident in the failure of the Government of Prime Minister Al-Maliki in making permanent the appointment of  CoI Commissioner Raheem Hassan Augaili, who has served for several years on an acting basis.  This has had a deleterious effect on CoI’s ability to undertake vigorous anti-corruption measures.

Most importantly, the citizens of Iraq need themselves to want to end corruption and to act accordingly, as through the ballot box.  Education of the populace will continue to be essential, if change is to be lasting.  Such work needs to continue

U.S. Embassy,  Baghdad’s Leading Anti-Corruption Role in Iraq

The Anti-Corruption Coordination Office [ACCO] has played the leading leadership role in anti-corruption efforts in Iraq, on the part of the international donor community.  Ably led until recently by U.S. Career Ambassador Joseph D. Stafford, ACCO was responsible for convening and leading an Anti-Corruption Working Group and managing the extensive training and education projects of the U.S. Department of Justice [ICITAP, the International Criminall Criminal Investigative Training Program--which has performed with notable positive effect], UNDP, IRI and the Iraq Foundation, among other implementing partners.  All these organizations worked hard and effectively in their respective areas to provide education and training throughout Iraq to help stem official corruption.

Conclusion:  Portents for the Future

When a government is finally formed in Iraq [although national elections were held on March 7, 2010, the two principal contenders, Nouri al-Maliki and Ayad Allawi, have not, as of this writing, been able to agree on a division of power], There needs to be a reaffirmation at the highest levels of support for implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and this needs to be accompanied by the permanent appointment of the head of the Commission of Integrity.  There must be genuine commitment--on the part of the Government and the people of Iraq-- to stem public corruption in Iraq. The international donor community has made a difference, and this active support must continue, for the long-term benefit of the people of Iraq.  They—and the world—deserve as much.